This report provides our projections of General Fund revenues and
expenditures for 2004-05 through 2009-10. It includes our independent assessment of the outlook for California's economy, demographics, revenues,
and expenditures.
Chapter 1 contains our principal findings and conclusions. Chapter 2 presents our economic and demographic projections, Chapter 3 our revenue
forecasts, and Chapter 4 our expenditure projections.
Our fiscal projections reflect current-law spending requirements and tax
provisions. They are not predictions of future policy decisions by the Legislature, nor
are they our recommendations as to what spending and revenue levels should be.
This report, in its tenth year of publication, reflects the historical mission
of the Legislative Analyst's Office to assist the Legislature with its fiscal planning
by assessing the revenues and expenditures of the state. The report is part of
an ongoing series and is updated periodically.
Chapter 1
The Budget Outlook 1
Chapter 2
Economic and Demographic Projections
9
Chapter 3
Revenue Projections 19
Chapter 4
Expenditure Projections
27
In approaching the 2005-06 budget,
California's policymakers face a deceptively difficult
challenge. On the one hand, the strengthening revenue
picture, coupled with the availability of the
remaining $3.5 billion in authorized deficit-financing
bonds that have not yet been used, would enable the
Legislature to balance the 2005-06 budget by making
a relatively modest amount of hard choices to
reduce spending and/or augment revenues.
This would only be a temporary fix, however, as the 2005-06 outlook masks a much more
negative underlying budget picture. This is because the 2005-06 budget will be helped by a carry-over balance and various limited-term solutions enacted
in the 2004-05 budget which will not be available
in subsequent years. As a result, these solutions
cannot be counted on to address the state's large
and persistent ongoing structural budget shortfall.
We project that this shortfall will reach nearly
$10 billion in 2006-07 under current-law spending
and revenue policies, absent corrective actions.
The size and persistence of this shortfall, even
in the face of an expanding economy and strengthening revenues, underscores a critical point that
we have made in the pastnamely, it is unlikely
that California will be able to simply "grow its way
out" of this shortfall.
Given the above, we believe it is critical that the Legislature act now to address the large underlying structural budget imbalance. Every ongoing budget solution that is adopted this year will reduce the amount of actions that will be needed later. Conversely, postponing action will only make the state's fiscal matters worse in the future. Therefore, we recommend that the state adopt real and ongoing solutions to close the budget gap in 2005-06 and that it not sell the remaining $3.5 billion in deficit-financing bonds at this time. Such an approach will have the dual benefits of both (1) reducing the structural deficit in later years through adopting ongoing solutions, and (2) preserving the bonding authority for possible use in 2006-07 or thereafter, when the current-law structural shortfall gets much larger and harder to deal with.
The 2004-05 budget adopted last summer addressed a roughly $15 billion budget shortfall. As shown in Figure 1, that budget plan contained a variety of budget-balancing actions, including substantial borrowing, a two-year diversion of property taxes, targeted revenue increases, funding shifts (including higher education student fee increases), and significant program savings in education and other areas of the budget.
Proposition 98 Suspension. The budget
package included a suspension of Proposition 98 and
language in Chapter 213, Statutes of 2004, that
2004-05 education spending be set at $2 billion less than
the minimum guarantee. (This language, in effect,
signals the Legislature's intent to provide
more/less funding if the guarantee increases/decreases
during the yearfor example, due to changes in
revenues or attendance.) The difference between this
Chapter 213 "target" level and the actual amount
appropriated by the budget$302 millionis shown
as a Proposition 98 reserve in the 2004-05 budget.
General Fund Condition. Under the budget
plan, the 2004-05 fiscal year was estimated to
conclude with a reserve balance of $768 million, of
which $302 million was earmarked for Proposition 98
and the remaining $466 million was to be available
for non-Proposition 98 purposes. Because of
the budget's reliance on one-time or limited-term
solutions, it was clear when the budget was adopted that the
state would continue to face substantial budget shortfalls in the
future, absent further corrective actions.
Since the 2004-05 budget was enacted, there have been various developments affecting the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget. Key changes in our fiscal estimates relative to the budget act are shown in Figure 2.
|
Figure 2 Effect of Recent
Developments on 2004-05 Budget |
||
|
(In Millions) |
||
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05 Budget Year-End Reserve |
|
|
|
Proposition 98 reserve |
$302 |
|
|
Non-Proposition 98 reserve |
466 |
|
|
Total |
|
$768 |
|
Higher Revenues (2003-04 Plus 2004-05) |
|
|
|
2003-04
major taxes |
$430 |
|
|
2004-05
major taxes |
1,997 |
|
|
2004-05
nontax revenues |
-364 |
|
|
Subtotal
(increase to reserve) |
|
$2,063 |
|
Higher Costs/Reduced Savings |
|
|
|
Punitive damage award redirection |
$390 |
|
|
Unallocated savings |
316 |
|
|
Corrections |
201 |
|
|
Medi-Cal |
96 |
|
|
Trial courts |
90 |
|
|
Proposition 98: lower |
-445 |
|
|
Other |
212 |
|
|
Subtotal
(decrease to reserve) |
|
$860 |
|
Revised
Reserve: |
|
$1,971 |
|
Proposition 98 Reserve |
|
(1,357) |
|
Non-Proposition 98 Reserve |
|
(614) |
Revenues Up Sharply. We estimate that the major
taxes will exceed the budget estimate by $2.4 billion over
2003-04 and 2004-05 combined, due to a sharp increase
in the corporation tax and more moderate gains in both the personal income tax and the sales and
use tax. Partly offsetting the increase in tax revenues is
a $364 million decline in nontax revenues, due
to lower-than-expected receipts from tribal gaming revenues and the sale of surplus property. The
net increase in General Fund revenues is $2.1 billion.
Costs Are Also Up. Offsetting a significant
portion of the revenue increase are higher state
costs totaling about $860 million. The increases are
occurring in a variety of areas, including
corrections, Medi-Cal, trial court funding, and spending on
state operations. In some instances, the higher costs
are occurring because the amount of savings
resulting from various budgetary solutions is falling short
of earlier estimates.
Revised Reserve. Taking into account the
higher revenues and higher costs, we estimate that the
year-end reserve increases by about $1.2 billion, to
just under $2 billion.
Proposition 98 Interaction. The increase in
projected 2004-05 tax revenues increases the
minimum Proposition 98 K-14 funding guarantee by
about $1 billion compared to the budget plan.
Consequently, if the Legislature funds Proposition 98
at the Chapter 213 target level (that is, $2 billion
below the guarantee), it would require a $1 billion
increase in school appropriations. In Figure 2, we
have reflected this higher obligation as an increase in
the Proposition 98 reserve from $302 million
to $1.357 billion. This leaves $614 million of the
total reserve available for non-Proposition 98
purposes, only a marginal increase from the $466 million
estimated at the time the budget was enacted. Thus,
the large increase we project in tax revenues is
almost completely offset by increased spending due to
the Proposition 98 interaction and higher costs in
other program areas.
Figure 3 shows the General Fund condition through 2005-06, using the assumptions outlined in the accompanying box. We estimate that revenues will climb to $82.2 billion and expenditures will total $89.5 billion in 2005-06, resulting in a $7.3 billion operating shortfall (that is, the difference between annual revenues and annual expenditures). After taking into account the $614 million non-Proposition 98 reserve available from 2004-05, the 2005-06 year-end deficit would be $6.7 billion.
|
Figure 3 LAO Projection of General
Fund Condition |
|||
|
2003-04 Through 2005-06 |
|||
|
|
2003-04 |
2004-05 |
2005-06 |
|
Prior-year balance |
$4,178 |
$3,542 |
$1,543a |
|
Revenues and transfers |
75,000 |
78,884 |
82,247 |
|
Deficit-financing bond |
2,012 |
— |
— |
|
Total Resources Available |
$81,190 |
$82,426 |
$83,790 |
|
Expenditures |
77,649 |
79,526 |
89,540a |
|
Ending fund balance |
$3,542 |
$2,899 |
-$5,751 |
|
Encumbrances |
929 |
929 |
929 |
|
Reserve |
$2,613 |
$1,971 |
-$6,680 |
|
Proposition
98 |
— |
(1,357) |
— |
|
Non-Proposition
98 |
— |
(614) |
— |
|
|
|||
|
a
Assumes that 2004-05 Proposition 98 reserve is appropriated. |
|||
Year-End Condition if Proposition 98 Not
Increased. If appropriations for Proposition 98
were not increased in the current year, spending in
the current year and budget year each would be reduced by
$1.4 billion. This would reduce the 2005-06 year-end
shortfall from the $6.7 billion shown in Figure 3
down to $3.9 billion.
Our revenue and expenditure forecasts are based primarily on the requirements of current
law, including constitutional and statutory funding requirements. Our estimates also reflect
projected changes in caseloads, federal reimbursements, and other factors affecting program costs. Of
special significance in the current forecast are our assumptions in the following three areas.
Governor's Higher Education
Compact. In the current forecast, we have not assumed the
Governor's "compact" with higher education, as the Legislature has taken no statutory action to
implement such an agreement. Rather, our estimates for higher education are based on projected enrollment
and inflation-related increases. Fully funding the compact would require added annual
expenditures beyond those we are projecting, reaching over $500 million by the final year of our forecast period.
Future Proposition 58 Transfers to the Budget Stabilization
Account. Proposition 58, approved by the voters in March 2004, created a Budget Stabilization Account (BSA) to cushion the state
against budget-related shortfalls. The measure provided for annual transfers of General Fund revenues to
the BSA, equaling 1 percent of General Fund revenues in 2006-07 (about $875 million), 2 percent
in 2007-08 (about $1.9 billion), and 3 percent in 2008-09 (about $2.9 billion) and thereafter until
the balance in the fund reaches $8 billion. The measure, however, allows the transfers to be suspended
or reduced through a Governor's executive order. Given the major budget shortfalls we are
already projecting in the out years, we have not included the added expenditures that would be needed
to fund the annual transfers to the BSA in our estimates.
Interaction of Proposition 98 With Revenue
Increases. Our baseline estimates include the
impacts of the current-year increase in revenuesand other factorson the Proposition 98 spending
levels. This is consistent with language in Chapter 213, which was enacted with this year's budget.
However, given the increased General Fund shortfalls and increased pressures on non-Proposition 98
programs that would result from this use of revenues, we also show the outlook assuming no change
in 2004-05 Proposition 98 appropriations. Our estimates are not predictions of what the Legislature and Governor will adopt as policies
and funding levels in future budgets. Rather, our estimates are intended to be a reasonable
"baseline" projection of what would happen if current-law policies were allowed to operate in the future. In
this regard, we believe that our forecast provides a meaningful starting point for legislative
deliberations involving the state's budget.
Basis for Our Estimates
Projections, Not Predictions
Our longer-term revenue and expenditure forecasts through 2009-10 are detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Figure 4 shows the effects of these projections on the state's operating deficitannual revenues minus expendituresunder two scenarios:
The state has been plagued with a large
structural budget shortfall since 2001-02, when
revenues plunged following the recession and the
steep decline in the stock market. The annual gap
between projected revenues and expenditures has been massive, reaching
as much as one-quarter of annual General Fund
spending. While the state has addressed the annual
shortfalls in each of the past three budgets, many of
the solutions have involved borrowing, spending
deferrals, accounting shifts, and other one-time
actions. As the benefits of these one-time solutions fell
away in subsequent years, the large underlying
structural shortfall reemerged.
The one-time and limited-term savings included in the 2004-05 budget are highlighted in
Figure 5. They include savings from deficit-financing bonds, pension obligation bonds, Proposition 42 transportation loans, postponement of
local mandate payments, and diversion of local
property taxes.
These actions, along with substantial borrowing undertaken in previous budgets, are resulting in
significant current and future General Fund costs.
As indicated in the accompanying box, annual General Fund costs related to budget borrowing
will peak at nearly $4 billion annually in 2006-07
through 2008-09, before trailing off somewhat in
subsequent years.
Figure 5 One-Time or Limited-Term
Solutions in 2004-05 Budget
Deficit-financing bond proceeds ($2 billion)
Proposition 42 transportation loan ($1.3 billion)
Diversion of local property taxes ($1.3 billion annually for two
years)
Pension obligation bond proceeds ($929 million)
Postponement of local mandate payments (about $200 million)
Suspension of teachers’ tax credit (about $200 million annually
for two years)
Approaching the Budget Problem
As discussed above, our projections indicate that, absent corrective actions, the state will not resolve its structural imbalance. As a result, it is important that the Legislature take meaningful actions in 2005-06 to address this shortfall. In this regard, we believe that there are four basic "building-blocks" that should be considered in crafting a strategy for dealing with the budget shortfall in 2005-06:
While it is tempting to use deficit-financing bonds to avoid the more painful budget choices in 2005-06, making real changes in the budget year would enable the state to make meaningful progress toward eliminating the structural problem that has plagued the state since 2001-02.
Borrowing and the Budget ShortfallAs noted elsewhere in this report, we believe that the Legislature should minimize the use of budget-related borrowing in its solutions to the projected 2005-06 budget shortfall. The state has already accumulated $26 billion of outstanding budget-related debt, consisting of $18 billion in bonds, $4 billion in loans from local governments and schools, and about $4 billion in loans from transportation and resources special funds. This budget-related borrowing is in addition to the $40 billion in traditional borrowing used to finance new infrastructure. Borrowing Is a Temporary Fix . . .While budget-related borrowing enables the state to maintain funding for programs and avoid deeper cuts or revenue augmentations in the year in which it is undertaken, it is a temporary solution, which does nothing to address the ongoing mismatch between revenues and expenditures. . . . That Diverts Resources From Future BudgetsJust as importantly, the borrowing eventually becomes a drag on future budgets, as revenues are diverted from current programs to pay for past borrowing. As shown in the figure, the budgetary borrowing already undertaken will result in annual General Fund costs of nearly $4 billion for the 2006-07 through 2008-09 fiscal period. While the costs will drop off in subsequent fiscal years, they will remain above $2 billion annually until the Proposition 57 deficit bonds are repaid (anywhere from 2013 to 2018). Over the next several years, these budget-related borrowing costs will account for over 40 percent of the annual operating shortfalls that we are projecting. Additional debt will only add to the size of these future diversions, and will hamper meaningful progress toward resolving the state's ongoing structural shortfall.
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Economic and demographic developments are important determinants of California's fiscal condition, mainly because of their impacts on state revenues and expenditures in such areas as education, health, social services, and transportation. This chapter presents our economic and demographic projections for 2004 through 2010, which will affect California's fiscal condition during fiscal years 2004-05 through 2009-10.
Despite sharply rising fuel prices and
somewhat uneven job gains, both the national and state
economies have experienced solid economic growth over
the past year. The gains have been fueled by strong
performances in interest-sensitive sectors such as
housing, as well as healthy gains in business capital
investment and continued strength in consumer spending.
Looking ahead, we expect economic growth to slow modestly in 2005 due to the constraining
impacts on the economy of high household debt levels, the rise in energy costs, and mild increases
in interest rates. In subsequent years, our outlook
calls for moderate expansion at both the national
and state levels. Figure 1 summarizes the details of
our economic forecasts for the nation and state. In
the subsequent sections, we discuss in more detail
major factors underlying our forecasts.
Figure 1 The LAO’s Economic
Forecast Percentage Change (Unless Otherwise Indicated) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 United States Real gross domestic product 4.3% 3.4% 3.5% 3.3% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% Personal income 5.3 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2 Wage and salary jobs 1.0 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 Consumer Price Index 2.7 2.7 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 Unemployment rate (%) 5.5 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 Housing starts (000) 1,933 1,771 1,664 1,627 1,615 1,598 1,617 California Personal income 5.9% 5.5% 5.8% 6.1% 6.3% 6.3% 6.2% Wage and salary jobs 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 Taxable sales 6.5 5.6 5.6 6.0 6.5 5.8 5.7 Consumer Price Index 2.8 3.1 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6 Unemployment rate (%) 6.1 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 Housing starts (000) 207 195 183 176 187 179 178
The national economy has experienced
broad-based economic growth over the past year.
Although the third quarter's real (that is,
inflation-adjusted) gross domestic product (GDP)
growthinitially reported at a 3.7 percent annual ratewas
modestly below expectations, the shortfall was
mainly related to less-than-expected accumulation of
business inventories, as opposed to a softening in
consumer or business demand.
Monthly information for October and early November suggests that solid economic growth is
continuing in the final quarter of 2004. After
several months of sluggish gains, job growth
rebounded sharply in October. Although some of the
increase was due to post-hurricane rebuilding activity in
the southeastern U.S., the October expansion was
widespread, affecting most major industry sectors.
Recent reports on retail sales, company profits, new orders
for manufactured goods, and consumer confidence,
also point toward healthy fourth-quarter economic
growth. Finally, the stock market, after lagging for much of
2004, jumped in early November, reflecting optimism
about future business sales and profits.
Although the near-term
outlook is clearly positive, the U.S. economy faces at least two
key challenges as of late 2004. These are high oil-related
priceswhich are boosting the costs of gasoline and heating
oiland the uneven job gains in 2004.
Oil Prices. As indicated in the accompanying box,
world oil prices have jumped dramatically in 2004,
having reached an all-time high of $55 per barrel in mid-October
before sliding back to slightly below $50 as of early
November. The oil price jump has had a major adverse impact on
prices paid by American consumers for gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, and other
oil-based commodities. It is also negatively affecting
consumer confidence, and will likely have a modest
negative impact on spending over the next year.
Jobs. Although the U.S. job report for
October was bullish, the employment gains over the past
year have been uneven, with businesses
relying on added hours and productivity gains from their
existing workforce rather than hiring additional
employees. This strategy has worked so far, yielding major gains
in business earnings, as well as higher wages for
some workers. However, the lack of broad-based job
growth remains a risk to the durability of the expansion,
in that, if continued, it may undercut consumer
confidence and spending throughout the economy.
After several years of relative stability, oil prices have soared in 2004, reflecting the impacts
of sharply rising worldwide demand, the lack of new production capacity, and numerous supply
disruptions in the Gulf of Mexico and abroad. As shown in the accompanying figure, the
per-barrel price of crude oil rose from $19 in early 2002 to $30 in early 2004, before soaring nearly to $50 in
the final quarter of the year. The increase in crude oil prices has in turn boosted retail prices of
gasolinewhere the average per gallon price in late October surpassed $2 nationwide, and $2.40 in
Californiaas well as heating oil and a variety of other oil-based products.
The increases that have already occurred will have modest adverse effects on inflation and
real economic growth over the next year. Indeed, the modest economic slowdown we are projecting
in 2005 is partly related to the effects of higher energy costs on household confidence and
discretionary incomes. We do not, however, expect the negative economic impacts to be anywhere near as
dramatic as in the 1970s and early 1980s, when sharply rising oil prices sent the U.S. economy into two
recessions. The main reason is that, while oil prices are at an all-time high, they are nowhere near the
levels reached in 1980 in inflation-adjusted terms. As shown in the figure, in constant 2004 dollars,
oil prices peaked at more than $80 per barrel in 1981.
In addition, the consumption of oil-based products as a percentage of economic output
and income is less today than a quarter century ago, meaning that the proportional impact of any
given crude oil price increase is less today than in the past. A related factor is that the oil price increases
do not appear to be having the same type of
adverse "ripple" effects on other prices throughout
the economy as they did in the 1970s and early
1980s. Businesses have thus far managed to "hold the
line" on retail prices, due to offsetting savings related
to, for example, worker productivity increases.
Absent more broad-based increases in economy-wide inflation, it thus is
unlikely that the oil price increases will have the
dramatic negative impacts on interest rates and other
elements of the economy that they did in the 1970s.
Impact of High Oil Prices
Our forecast assumes that the U.S. economy will expand at a solid though moderating pace in 2005. As indicated in Figure 2, we forecast that year-over-year increases in inflation-adjusted GDP will subside from the current 4 percent pace to around 3 percent by mid 2005, before accelerating modestly in 2006. This outlook assumes continued healthy increases in business investment, but slowing growth in consumer spending.
Our national outlook assumes that:
The California economy has experienced
generally healthy growth since mid-2003. The state
has faced challenges in many areasmost recently
being the major increase in gasoline costs.
However, most measures of statewide economic
activitysuch as taxable sales, personal income, permits for
new construction, and company profit
reportssuggest that the state's economy is clearly on an upward
track as 2004 draws to a close.
Factors boosting economic growth over the past year have included:
Similar to the national pattern, we expect that California's economic growth will continue in 2005, although at a more moderate pace than in 2004. As indicated earlier in Figure 1, personal income is forecast to slow from 5.9 percent in 2004 to 5.5 percent in 2005, but then average over 6 percent for the balance of the forecast period. On the positive side, the national outlook for continued strong business investment will boost many industries in this state. On the negative side, however, we expect that high energy costs and rising interest rates will take a significant toll on consumer spending and housing activity in the state.
Employment Picture MixedSome
Improvement Expected. Over the past year, the
employment picture has been uneven. According to the
monthly survey of employers, payroll jobs (which
economists follow closely in gauging the strength of the
job markets) have increased by just 110,000
between September 2003 and September 2004, a growth
rate of just 0.8 percent. This is less than one-third
the number of payroll jobs that would normally be
expected at this stage of an expansion.
As we have indicated in previous forecasts, the separate survey of households (which is mainly
used to calculate the unemployment rate) shows
significantly more job growth. Using this alternative
measure, the total number of jobs in California has
increased by over 300,000 in the past year, a more
respectable 2 percent growth. The discrepancy
between the two job measures may reflect an
increase in the number of individuals working as
independent contractors. Such workers would be
counted in the household survey but not necessarily
included in the survey of employers. While the higher
job growth totals in the household survey is
encouraging, its exact implications for the economy are
uncertain. This is because little is known from
the household survey about the nature of the nonpayroll jobsfor
example, whether they are full or part time, or their pay and benefit
levels. In any event, the reluctance of employers to expand their
permanent work force remains a concern in the outlook.
Looking ahead, we forecast that job growth will
improve modestly, from 0.9 percent in 2004 to 1.4 percent in 2005
(an increase of 210,000 jobs), as businesses step up hiring
to meet continued growth in output and sales. Over the
2006-through-2010 period, job growth is forecast to
average 1.7 percent per year (about 240,000 jobs annually), a
rate that is roughly consistent with projected adult
population growth and thus labor force expansion.
Personal Income Growth Has Been More
Positive. While California's job
performance has been disappointing, the recent rebound in personal
income has been more positive. As shown in Figure 3, after falling sharply in the 2001 recession, real
personal income growth jumped sharply to almost 4 percent
in early 2004, due to healthy increases in wages and
business earnings. Although we project a modest slowdown in
personal income during 2005, growth should remain in the solid
3 percent to 4 percent range through the forecast period.
International Exports Finally
Improving. Exports are an important element
of California's economy. In 2003, international sales of
California-produced goods totaled about $95 billion, directly
accounting for about 7 percent of California's gross state
product. Over one-half of California's exports related to
high-tech goods, such as computers, electronics, and aerospace
products. Other key export categories include paper,
chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.
As shown in Figure 4, after lagging since 2001,
international exports jumped to a quarterly level of over $27 billion (over
20 percent growth) in the first half of 2004. Key factors
behind the growth are the declining value of the U.S.
dollar (which makes U.S. goods more competitive in
foreign markets), major growth in the economies of China and other developing nations on the
Pacific Rim, and a long-awaited acceleration in
Japan's economy. We expect export growth to continue
in 2005 and 2006, although at a slower pace than
in 2004.
A Key Factor In California's
OutlookHousing. California's housing market has been booming,
as evidenced by record sales levels, dramatic price
increases, and strong levels of new construction. As
of September 2004, the median price of a detached single-family home in California was $465,000,
up over 20 percent from the prior year. Home
construction will likely exceed 200,000 units in 2004, the
strongest level in 15 years.
Our forecast assumes that prices will level off
and that sales and new construction will retreat
modestly from 2004 levels. As shown in Figure 5, we
assume that permits for new construction will fall slightly below 200,000 in 2005, and slide a bit
further to around the 180,000-to-190,000 range for
the remainder of the forecast period. Our forecast
assumes that interest rates will increase only
modestly, and that underlying population and income
growth result in continued strong demand for new
housing. This forecast is vulnerable, though, to a
larger-than-expected climb in interest rates. Given that
many recent home buyers are already financially
stretched by large mortgages, rising rates on variable
interest rate loans could further squeeze their
household budgets. For prospective buyers, such higher
rates would further reduce the affordability of new
homes, resulting in fewer sales and downward pressure
on home prices. These developments could depress
construction activity, and potentially reduce levels
of spending and income in other areas of the economy.

California's population currently totals
over 36 million persons. During the six-year forecast
period covered in this report, Figure 6 shows that the state's population growth is
projected to average about 1.3 percent annually. In terms
of numbers of people, this annual growth
translates into about half-a-million people and is
roughly equivalent to adding a new city the size of Long
Beach to California each year. As a result, California
will add roughly 3 million people over the forecast
interval and reach over 39 million by 2010.
The population growth rate we are projecting is somewhat slower than that experienced in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, when growth was
averaging about 1.6 percent. This reflects both the
dampening effects of the slower economy of recent years on
in-migration, plus a continuing downward trend in birth rates.

California's population growth can be broken
down into two major componentsnatural
increase (the excess of births over deaths) and
net in-migration (persons moving into California from
other states and countries, minus those leaving California for
out-of-state destinations). On average, these two components
have tended in the past to contribute about equally over time
to the state's population growth. However, their relative
shares can vary significantly from one year to the next
depending largely on the strength of the net in-migration
componentby far the most volatile element.
Natural Increase. We project that the
natural-increase component will average close to
300,000 new Californians annually over the forecast
period. This net natural gain reflects an annual average
of around 550,000 births partially offset by about 250,000 deaths.
Our forecast incorporates the well-documented trend of declining birth rates that has been
occurring for essentially all ethnic groups in recent
years in California. Despite these declining birth
rates, however, the number of new births in our
forecast actually trends up a bit through 2010. This is due
to significant growth in the female population of
child-bearing age groups in the faster-growing
segments of California's population, including Hispanic
and Asian women. As a result, even after accounting
for growth in the number of deaths occurring
annually in California, we project that the natural
increase component will grow slightly during the latter
half of the forecast period.
Net In-Migration. We project that combined
domestic and foreign net in-migration will average roughly 206,000 annually over the next six
years. This is weaker than during the latter half of the
1990s and early 2000s when annual net in-migration
averaged about 260,000. It also is considerably less
than the projected 300,000 natural-increase
component noted above.
Figure 7 shows our population growth projections by broad age categories, including both numerical and percentage growth.
Baby Boomers Swelling 45-64 Age Group. The 45-to-64 age group
(largely the "baby boomers") continues to be by far the
fastest growing segment of the population. Nearly 1.6 million additional people are expected in
this age category over the next six years.
Slow Growth for Children. At the other
extreme, slow growth is anticipated for preschoolers and
the K-12 school-age population. This reflects several
factors. One is the movement of children of the
"baby boom" generation beyond the upper-end of the 5-to-17 age group, which partially explains the above-average growth in the 18-24 age
category. Other factors include the slower rate of net
in-migration, and the decline in birth rates in recent
years that has reduced the number of children
moving into the preschool and school-age categories.
These various age-group demographic projections can have significant implications for the
state's revenue and expenditure outlook. For
example, strong growth of the 45-64 age group generally
benefits tax revenues since this is the age category
that routinely earns the highest wages and salaries.
Likewise, the growth in the young adult population
affects college enrollments, while that for the
0-to-4 and 5-to-17 age groups drives K-12
enrollment growth.
The revenues that finance California's state General Fund budget come from numerous sources, including taxes, fees, licenses, interest earnings, loans, and transfers. However, over 90 percent of the total is attributable to the state's "big three" taxesthe personal income tax (PIT), the sales and use tax (SUT), and the corporation tax (CT). In this chapter, we summarize our updated General Fund revenue projections and provide detail behind our key revenue-related assumptions.
Before presenting our revenue forecast, it is first useful to review where things currently stand in terms of recent revenue-related trends that serve as the "springboard" to our revenue projections.
Total cash receipts from major taxes during the first four months of this fiscal year have exceeded the 2004-05 budget projection by over $900 million, largely reflecting much-stronger-than-expected CT receipts. Despite the mild slowdown in overall economic activity that we are projecting for 2005, we believe that the stronger revenue trend will hold through the remainder of this fiscal year, and that total revenues through June 30, 2005, will exceed the budget estimate by slightly over $2 billion. About $430 million of this increase is attributable to final returns for 2003 tax liabilities, and thus will be accrued back to 2003-04. The balance will be reflected as higher revenues in the current year.
Figure 1 shows that estimated tax payments under the CT were up from the prior year by 28 percent in the third quarter of calendar-year 2004. These higher payments were primarily attributable to large increases by firms in the petroleum, finance, and high-tech manufacturing industries. The figure also indicates that PIT-related estimated tax payments were up by over 15 percent in the third quarter from the same time in the prior year. We believe that this increase was likewise due to strong business paymentsin this case, those related to earnings of the subset of businesses that file under the PIT (such as S-corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships).
Revenue collections from other sources have been growing at a more subdued, but still healthy, rate in 2004. For example, Figure 2 shows that after a strong performance in late 2003 and early 2004, the growth in PIT-related withholding paymentswhich are attributable to employee wages, salaries, stock options, and bonusesmoderated to about 6 percent as of the third quarter of 2004. These recent increases are generally consistent with solid wage gains but relatively subdued employment gains over the past year. We believe that some of the recent slowdown is related to a slackening of stock option-related activity since the stock market peaked in early 2004.
Figure 3 presents our updated revenue projections for the period 2003-04 through 2009-10.
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Figure 3 The LAO’s General Fund
Revenue Forecast |
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(Dollars in Millions) |
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Revenue Source |
2003-04 |
2004-05 |
2005-06 |
2006-07 |
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